

Militant Islam in Russia - Potential for Conflict

Georgi N. Engelhardt
Moscow Institute of Religion and Policy

The horrible slaughter in Beslan along with other terrorist attacks across the Russian Federation in the latter half of 2004 have underscored a definitive shift in Russia's internal political dynamic. Viewed as a power struggle, there are now only two major players in Russian politics – President V. Putin's government and that of militant Islam. The domestic political party opposition to Putin, ranging from right-wing liberals to the Communists, while still present in party form, was almost totally eliminated from positions of real power in the 1999 and 2003 elections. Furthermore, the Presidential staff exercises more and more control over regional power brokers and major business tycoons. The growing adherents of various forms of radical Islam, increasingly capable of and prepared to use force in order to meet their anti-government objectives, are de-facto the only rival political force within the Russian Federation. The Militant Islamic movement in Russia is quickly developing beyond the Chechen separatist movement to include a growing branch of resident Muslims and sympathizers who have taken to political activity under the cover and relative security of Russian citizenship. Although not all Islamist groups critical of the government are prepared to use violence to achieve their aims, the spread of extreme forms of Islamic teachings and the growing sense of their own power in contrast to the fragmenting nature of the Federal government are phenomena which many analysts believe the Kremlin is unprepared for. Analysis has shown that the success of the recent terrorist acts is due largely to this second wing of militant Islam outside the category of the separatist movement in Chechnya. Many new questions are forcing themselves on Russia. How did this political branch of militant Islam come about? What are its structures and goals? More importantly, how is the Russian state dealing with this internal time bomb?

Forms of Militant Islam

Until now, the accepted description of militant Islamic activity in the Russian Federation has been confined to two principal aspects:

- Separatist rebels in Chechnya, whose adherence to the tenants of Islam, ostensibly derived from Wahhabi radicalism, is increasingly seen as an ideology utilized for purely political purposes. Despite denunciations of their actions on the part of other Islamic groups within Russia and abroad, their influence is considerable among the marginalized and radically inclined of Russia's estimated 14.5 million Muslims.
- Chechen based rebels linked with international radical Islamic organizations such as Al-Qaeda and foreign personnel participating in the hostilities against Federal forces in Chechnya.

Previously in the shadow of these two more visible forces, Islamic militancy from groups inside Russia proper is on the rise. This article intends to give a brief overview of the militant Islamic movement in Russia – its social base, organizational forms and prospects relative to the policy of the Russian government. The initiation of the “Second Chechen War” in the early fall of 1999 was then new president Putin's response to the apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk and

Volgodonsk and the incursion of Samir as-Swalem's (a.k.a. Amir al-Khattab) and Shamil Basaev's (Abdallah abu-Idris) guerrilla forces into neighboring Dagestan. This costly and questionably effective campaign against the Islamist radicals in the breakaway republic has been the cornerstone of Putin's image campaign as a resolute and effective national leader. Apart from threats and continued campaigns in the Chechen Republic, however, there has been little else done in the realm of policy making.

As of today, as well as 5 years ago, no other group besides those associated with militant Islam has had so much direct impact on the nation's life or had the power to divert the national agenda for almost 3 weeks (August 24-mid September). President Vladimir Putin expanded the scope of this threat in his Address to the Nation on September 4, 2004 by declaring that Russia was a strategic objective of international terrorist aggression, reiterating his position on the involvement of non-Russian organizations in terrorist operations in Russia. In an open letter on September 17, 2004 Chechen Islamic leader Shamil Basaev claimed responsibility for the recent massacre at the grade school in Beslan, the dual jet bombing of August 24 and subsequent Moscow subway bombing on August 31 while emphasizing that one of his key demands is the resignation of Vladimir Putin.¹

Social Base of Militant Islam in Russia

The social base for the development of Militant Islam can be found in the consequences of the post-communistic crisis, especially the rupture of social ties and the de facto blockage of channels for social mobility, particularly in the Russian provinces. Although it is clear that militant Islamists still represent a minority among the vast community of Muslims, the Muslim community in Russia is a substantial 10% of the population and growing steadily in comparison to the decline in births among ethnic Russians. Muftis are claiming "more than 20 million" while the census of 2002 showed that traditional ethnic Muslim groups in Russia: Tatars, Bashkirs, Dagestanis, Chechens, Ingushs, Azeris, Karachays, Balkars, Circassians and Kabardins and others at 14,5 million. Dagestan, Tatarstan and Chechnya have the largest concentrations of ethnic Muslims, but even so their combined populations account for less than half of this estimate. As the factor of confessional adherence wasn't included in the census there are no reliable nationwide data that show how many of those "ethnic Muslims" are actually practicing.

In the 1990's, the process of Islamic revival after Communist imposed atheism was marked by serious foreign involvement. Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar and organizations associated with these states as well as prominent individuals extensively sponsored the development of religious infrastructure and education in Russia. This caused serious conflict at top levels of the Muslim community as well as in numerous local mosques where Arab-educated bearers of "pure Islamic teaching" claimed authority over the moderate mullahs that were traditionally loyal to the government. This radicalization has developed primarily among the native ethnic Muslim population in Russia.

This conflict engulfed the whole Russian Islamic community, taking extreme form in Chechnya where confrontation with militant Islamists made traditionalists (led by the late Mufti Ahmad Kadyrov) seek alliance with the Kremlin. This process caused division throughout Russia, with local dynamics varying from the co-existence of traditional and more radical Regional Islamic

Spiritual Boards (e.g. Bashkiria, Tyumen and Perm) to the extreme of domination of one faction in a given region (Tatarstan, Saratov). In general CDUM-aligned traditionalists² are losing ground nationwide to the more radical muftis of the CMR.³ It was during this process that the latter began to position itself as “Traditional Islam” in its relations with the government.

The spiritual and ideological vacuum left by the collapse of communism and rupture of social ties formed under the stress of surviving the Soviet era left many individuals in a unique state of psychological and physical isolation. Despite the opportunities of new freedoms after 1990, the channels of upward social mobility were mostly monopolized by local bureaucratic and police elites, making active and ambitious but “non-connected” individuals to feel bereft of any social prospective. Social alienation in Russia, as anywhere, puts a person into a constant face-off with peer groups and increases the attractiveness of any structured group-offering acceptance. This explains the strange mix of hatred-reverence for Chechens and other ethnic groups dispersed throughout Russia whose influence is based on ethnic, clan or religious bonds.

As on a global scale the success of 9/11 has attracted new supporters to “Al-Qaeda,” the activity of militant Islamic groups in the Northern Caucasus and in Moscow has been influential in attracting new adherents. The resulting general upsurge of Islamic influence in Russia can be seen in parallel with global trends. At the same time, the balance of influence within the Muslim community inside Russia is shifting towards radical elements of Islamic activism.⁴

Islamic propaganda only benefits from these conditions, giving added persuasive power to missionary material proclaiming religious values and moral superiority to hedonistic consumer society. Though much of the propaganda is intended to influence the non-religious to be more active, there are parallels with global Islamic propaganda based on Wahhabi extremism, which make promises of prosperity after the establishment of Shari’a based governments.

Further attraction for extremists is found in the charismatic aura of invincibility surrounding the leaders of militant Islam, fueled by propaganda such as Basaev’s boasting of his success in fighting the Russians as well as his personal strength and cleverness against Russian forces. The emphasis is to use videos, Internet and other media to show that Russian military and security forces are not a serious obstacle to Jihadi warriors or to the ultimate victory of militant Islam. Russian muftis claim that much of this propaganda effort could be negated through the development of religious education. There is also a concerted effort on the part of lobbyists inside the government to pressure for more funding for Islamic oriented education. The government has given into this pressure to some extent and has, for example, provided funding for the foundation of an Islamic University within Moscow State University.⁵ The efficacy of developing state-sponsored Islamic infrastructures for the purpose of curbing radicalism, however, has proven to be a dubious policy in other societies, such as Egypt and Algeria, where it has only fueled extremism. Russian analysts believe that this policy will only exacerbate the problem of radicalism. It is unclear whether state agencies will be able to control the use of extremist Arab literature in preaching and curricula in Islamic schools.

Another significant factor contributing to the growth of the Muslim population in the last decade has been the growing immigration from Central Asian countries, especially ethnic Tadjiks and Uzbeks. The reasons for this are understandable given the wide gap in the standard of living in

Russia as opposed to Central Asia. The presence of a growing demand for unskilled labor in the Russian Federation and the transparency of borders in these regions have insured that the immigration will continue for some time, at least. Central Asian regimes and especially Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov have also been more vigorous in the persecution of militant Islam's partisans and this has influenced migration to Russia as well. Active Islamic extremists fleeing persecution are in turn aggravating the more moderate ethnic Muslim populations in the regions where they are settling, particularly in European Russia and the Urals.

Structure of Militant Islam

According to various estimates, the number of active militants among the Chechen Islamic extremists hovers in the range of 1000-2000 people. This number is maintained by a system of constant rotation of active militants and through the involvement of non-Chechens. Since 1999, the separatist movement has been dominated by a Wahhabi Islamic style agenda – its leaders are 'Amirs' instead of the former 'Brigadier Generals,' operations are planned at 'Shura' meetings, their propaganda depicts Kremlin loyalists as 'munafeeks' or hypocrites who are apostates from religious orthodoxy. The 'munafaka' concept is one of the cornerstones of modern Islamic extremism because it provides a sharia'tic basis justifying attacks on other Muslims perceived to be 'apostate' from fundamentalist principles. Even the separatists Constitution, however fictitious, was redesigned in the radical Islamic style in 2002.⁶

The sphere of activity of this guerrilla force outside the actual territory of the Chechen Republic includes neighboring regions of the Northern Caucasus - Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo – Circassia and Northern Ossetia. The first attack on natural gas infrastructure was near Vyatskie Polyani (Kirov region) in December 1, 1999. It was accomplished by Tatar-Russian graduates from Yoldyz Madrasa in Naberezhnie Chelny (Tatarstan) and from Amir Al-Khattab's Kavkaz Islamic Institute – the latter a well known tactical training center in Chechnya. In the early spring of 2004 Shamil Basaev's groups claimed to have conducted operations in the Moscow suburbs, specifically the diversion of a local gas pipeline and one high-voltage electricity line, both of which were officially confirmed.⁷ On October 6 Dagestani anti-terrorist officials narrowly escaped a roadside bomb that hit their vehicle in an elite Moscow suburb. It is highly suspected that the activists responsible were from local extremist cells in Moscow.

The activity of armed militants in the Northern Caucasus is based on a wide network of support groups in the form of radical communities, known under the name "Jamaats". Though the term itself means only "Community of Moslems," it is widely used locally to stress the difference between radical Islamic structures and the more traditional groups and organizations, called Moslem Spiritual Boards, which generally adhere to more moderate versions of Islam. At present such Jamaats exist in practically all larger cities of the Russian Federation. This network is most advanced in regions of the Northern Caucasus, and also in a number of areas in the Volga region, not only Tatarstan and Bashkiria, long time Moslem areas, but in the predominantly Russian provinces such as the Uljanovsk, Penza, Volgograd and Astrakhan regions as well as Central Russia.

In the aftermath of the September Beslan crisis, ever-confident officials of the Tatarstan Muslim

Spiritual Board further confirmed the existence of uncontrolled radical groups in 'rural areas' and Tatarstan security officials also named imams in certain districts as extremist preachers operating outside the sphere of the Muslim Spiritual Board.⁸

The Jamaat network provides logistical support for specific operations. The overnight capture of Ingushetia on June, 22, 2004 followed by the massacre of local pro-Moscow's officials and security personnel, the actions in Dagestan, and the series of terrorist acts in Moscow all had such 'non-combatant' backup supplying intelligence, food, shelter and safe havens for the transport of militants and equipment. The Jamaat network is constantly recruiting new supporters in the form of sympathizers whose moderate views or social standing might prevent them from a more active role and at the same time provide cover for operations. The most important activity of the Jamaat, however, is the constant gathering of information from and applying pressure upon local Muslim communities and structures.

According to Russian prosecutors, suicide bombers in the Moscow subway terrorist acts of February 6 and August 31, 2004 belonged to one of the Karachay Jamaat led by Achemez Gochiyaev along with the bombers of the residential apartment explosions of 1999.

The growing importance of Russia-based Jamaat can be also seen from Shamil Basaev's letter of September 17 where, among other offers towards the Kremlin, the Chechen Islamist leader claims to have the capability to assure officials "that all Muslims of Russia would avoid the military struggle against the Russian Federation, for 10-15 years at least, if [the] freedom of conscience is upheld." This broad claim of control over Muslims in Russia proper is rather new for Basaev's rhetoric, which is usually centered on Chechen Islamist independence and general values of jihad. While most certainly an exaggeration, there is growing concern that the growing size and increased level of integration among Jamaats may make it easier for radicals to plan, execute and regroup after terrorist acts.

According to different estimates, at present (Fall 2004) the system of Jamaat is capable of mobilizing more than 10,000 extremist combatants, of this no less than 4000 from the regions around the Volga region and from Central Russia. Together with migrants from the countries of Central Asia, radical structures characteristic of these regions have also penetrated into the Russian Federation. First of all there is the London-based Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party), working mainly throughout Uzbekistan where its supporters are exposed to intense reprisals from authorities. Prior to the beginning of this century, Hizb ut-Tahrir's activity in Russia was limited to the creation of rear guard bases and safe heavens for their operations against Central Asian regimes. Arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir activists in Russia prior to 2002 were carried out mainly on the request of Uzbekistan's security service with subsequent extradition to Uzbekistan. Since 2003, however, more and more signs are appearing of the party's interest in working to promote militant Islam in Russia proper, in particular regarding joint operations with Chechen militants. For example during the recent spring – fall period of this year, the range of Hizb-ut-Tahreer operatives arrested by Russian police included those in Nizhny Novgorod and Tobolsk. On November 11, 2004, Yussup Kasimahunov, one of the party's Moscow operatives, was sentenced on charges of terrorism and recruiting others for terrorist acts. This was the first court decision against Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Russia. Well-known for their effective secret network, which includes extensive narcotrafficking, Hizb ut-Tahrir frequently organizes its jamaat on an

ethnic principle and thus has serious potential to strengthen its influence within the growing migrant community.

Ethnic Russian Moslems

A more appreciable element of the development of militant Islam in Russia is the process of Islamization of ethnic Russians and radicalization of these newly converted Moslems. Different estimates of their number range from 10,000 to 30,000 nationwide. The first public ethnic Russian Muslims organization of “The Straight Way” (Pryamoy Put) led by ex-Orthodox priest Ali Polosin was formed in 2000. In the summer of 2004 there emerged the National Organization of Russian Moslems (NORM), which criticized Polosin’s group for being too moderate and for avoiding participation in politics. Leaders of the NORM claim 2,500 followers while Moscow’s central Mosque officials recently claimed that 12,000 ethnic Russians had adopted Islam in the period from January-September 2004 alone, 75% of the individuals being girls between the ages of 17-21.¹⁰ This number is small compared to the 14.5 million ‘ethnic Muslims’ as shown by the 2002 census; but it is not negligible as converts are most often active and ambitious people seeking a vehicle of social promotion. However dubious these figures might be, it is the first instance of ethnic Russian Muslim organizations claiming mass conversions.

In contrast to the Turkic people of the Volga-Ural area and the Moslems of the Northern Caucasus, ethnic Russian converts to Islam do not have their own local Islamic tradition and these neophytes are more easily swayed by preachers of the ‘Pure Islam’ than lifelong ethnic Moslems who were born into these peer groups. For example, “Russian Moslems” were first to become suicide bombers in Chechnya in the summer of 2000.¹¹ The story of Moscovite girls recruited for suicide bombing by Basaev’s emissary at Moscow’s central Mosque’s in 2003¹² also demonstrates the weak points of ethnic profiling criteria used by police.

Government Response

While increased security measures such as random police checks across the country and generally intensified security around key infrastructure assets draws attention from the media, there is still no definable security policy regarding religiously motivated terrorism. Putin openly supports the US led war on terrorism but this positioning on the international arena has failed to produce any clear domestic policy for the specific situation in Russia, clearly more vulnerable to terrorism than America.

The Russian Federation is vulnerable to the development of terrorist warfare. The most vital flashpoints include territorial weaknesses and mobilization capabilities:

- Extended borders, which remain porous, especially in the south, easily permitting the infiltration of militants from abroad.
- National territory abundant with military, industrial and public infrastructure assets not designed to withstand terrorist attacks, especially in European Russia (e.g. pipeline networks, vital to the national economy). Russia’s vast size makes adequate protection of these potential terrorist targets a major challenge.
- Up to now, the Chechen guerilla forces have been the focus of Russian military, police

and security service efforts. Islamist raids in Ingushetia on June 22, 2004 demonstrated that without core improvements to combat efficiency, Russian military, police and security efforts will not be able to prevent more severe eventual terrorist attacks.

One cause of this vulnerability is the lack of any motivating ideology behind the national security policy in general. Putin's original pledge to focus on the security issue was derailed almost immediately in his first term with the resumption of the war in Chechnya. The outstanding feature of this policy since that time has been the refusal to negotiate with terrorists, which, along with staying the course in the war amidst criticism from abroad, has earned Putin a reputation for toughness, if not stubbornness. Putin's own political party, United Russia, has little in the way of ideology or political platform other than support of the President.

Perhaps the most important stumbling block to a coherent policy is the widespread distrust between the state and population at large. This distrust stems from the Soviet era and continues to inhibit popular cooperation with the state. In the area of security which most Russian citizens experience firsthand, the police, there is inefficiency, corruption and brutality that not only fosters a sense of helplessness and distance from the state, but also further contribute to independent associations for a sense of identity. Among the population at large, the post communist mentality has no coping mechanism for random violence other than the immutable patience exercised by Russians under the Soviets.

These core dysfunction in Russian society can't be overcome by the simple adoption of modernized and more efficient security techniques such as ethnic profiling and stricter security procedures.

Moscow is also unsure that the problem can be solved through cooperation with the West. The Russian political elite has no abiding interest in the War on Terrorism apart from sloganeering, as, up to now, it hasn't brought any tangible benefit or policy. From the beginning of its union with the West against international terrorism, Russia has sought solutions in the form of rapprochement with the Islamic world. Since the end of 2002, the concept of settling the Chechen conflict through the mediation of the Gulf States and international Islamic structures has been gaining momentum in Moscow. Representatives of the League of Arab States and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) monitored the March 2003 plebiscite on the Chechen Constitution and the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Chechnya in 2003-2004. In August 2003 President Vladimir Putin declared Russia's intention to obtain an observing status within the OIC.

Moscow has demonstrated its interest in collaboration with the Arab world, considering it as a perspective market for national industry and as a potential source of strategic investment for the economy. Prospects of large Saudi investments in Russia, up to \$200 billion, were being discussed after Prince Turki al-Feysal visited Moscow in October 2002.

The most recent course of action in line with the opening of dialogue with the Arab world has been the liberalization of channels for external financing for Islamic structures and education in Russia. Such sponsorship was all but stopped after 1999 because of the suspicion that such funding was being channeled to militant Islamic groups for the radicalization of local

communities. Since 2003, however, this process has been reopened for sponsoring official Moslem Spiritual Boards and their projects, such as the enlargement of the principal Mosque in Moscow and support for the Russian Islamic University of Kazan.

Another shift can be seen in the new approach towards domestic Islam. From 1999 to 2001, the Kremlin established alliances with the traditional Muslim clerics of the CDUM led by Talgat Tadjudin and with clerics from KCMSK12, then led by Muhammed Albogachaiev. However eager they were in providing the authorities with information about the penetration of radical elements into the Islamic community, they skillfully avoided any direct confrontation with radicals. The only exception was in warring Chechnya, where the alliance took the form of a Chechenization policy. In this case, Federal support was for former separatist Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov who symbolized the traditional Sufi networks threatened by the militant Islamists expansion. Since 2002, Moscow has been actively cooperating with officials of the more radical CMR in an effort to secure their support in pacifying the troublesome Islamic community. In the absence of a clearly stated general policy towards militant Islam or Islam itself, the main strategy is to support Islamic education as a vaccine to more radical preachers and their messages.

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, militant Islam remains the most immediate and serious political-military challenge to the Russian state. In the foreseeable future it will be necessary to acknowledge the inevitable expansion of militant Islam within the territorial borders of the Russian Federation. The reasons for this can be found in limited but unchecked migration of extremist individuals from Central Asia and the further radicalization of the indigenous ethnic Muslim population, including ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam. These factors are broadly augmented by the general upsurge of militant Islam in the world since September 11 and specifically in Russia by the success of recent terrorist acts that have not yet provoked any seriously aggressive security measures from the Russian state. Militant Islam in Russia has also spread from the relatively contained sphere of Chechnya to the Northern Caucasuses and Central Russia. Finally, Islamic extremism, while not yet a popular political movement on the national scale, is developing a social base and functional structures on a national scale.

The Russian state maintains its core security policy in continuing the low intensity conflict in Chechnya. In addition to this, it has become a member of the US-led War on Terrorism, begun developing ties with the international Islamic community to understand and monitor trends in the Islamic world and developed a more open stance to a variety of Islamic groups inside Russia with the hope that state sponsorship will lead to the espousal of moderate Islamic views. Though noble in principle and a positive sign of the states willingness to confront Islam on its own terms, this effort at detente through offering state sponsorship in the form of funding Islamic educational programs and establishing official forums remains a questionable strategy in light of failures elsewhere to stem radicalism with such measures.

The present security efforts, though more diverse than in recent years, are reactionary in nature, disparate without unity or ideological underpinning. At present, they represent but component parts of a fragmented strategy and are by themselves insufficient to meet the growing security challenges that lie ahead, to say nothing of the present situation. The strategy is generally

hindered by the lack of a strong, coherent and unified security policy with clear direction, specific goals and functional motivations for security forces and the public at large. The deficiencies regarding security policy are, indeed, part of a larger challenge facing Russia in the matter of national identity and the need for a functional platform of mutual interest and cooperation between the state, its security organs, including the police, and its citizens. The absence of any ideological platform has so far been one of the major barriers preventing the concerns Russians have about terrorism from being transformed into a truly vested interest in government policy with the accompanying motivations for involvement and identification with the state in its efforts to combat militant Islam.

Major Terrorist Acts in the Russian Federation with civilian casualties since the beginning of the second Chechen War

August – September 2004	Beslan Hostage Crisis	340 confirmed dead, hundreds unaccounted for
August 24, 2004	Dual airline bombing	89 dead
August 31, 2004	'Rizhskaya' Metro bombing	10 dead
February 6, 2004	Avtozavodskaya Metro bombing	39 dead
October 23-26, 2002	Nord Ost Theater Hostage Crisis	29 dead
May 9, 2002	Kaspiysk Festival bombing	40 dead
July 2000	'Pushkinskaya' Metro station bombing	10 dead
September 1999	Apartment bombings in Moscow, Buynaksk and Volgograd	300 dead

¹ Zayavleniye Amira Brigadi Shahidov "Riyadus-Salihiyna" Abdallaha Shamilya // www.daymohk.info, 17.09.2004.

² CDUM – Central Spiritual Muslim Board, led by Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadjudin since 1980. Based in Ufa, Bashkiria. Since 1990, Tadjudin has opposed Arab penetration into national Islam. It is present mainly in the Volga-Ural region with the exception of Tatarstan. It also has structures in St. Petersburg, Rostov and Northern Siberia.

³ CMR – Council of Muftis of Russia, a loose structure presided over by Mufti Ravil Gainutdin. Founded in 1994 by Tadjudin's former disciples and other 'young' Muftis. It is oriented towards co-operation with Arab sponsors. It predominates in Central Russia, including Moscow, the Volga-Ural region and Siberia. Members have monopoly control over mosques of Tatarstan (1,200 mosques), Saratov and Nizhni Novgorod.

⁴ Crimin A., Engelhardt G. Vliyanie 11 sentyabrya na rosiyskiy islam // NIISS, 21.03.2002.

⁵ web-page: <http://www.islam.ru/press/rus/2004-06-15?single=5281>.

⁶ Ignatenko A. Islam i politika. Moscow, 2004, p. 181; web-page:

<http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/article.php?id=5269>.

⁷ Razvedka modjahedov v Podmoskov'e (video) // www.kavkazcenter.com, 09.03.2004.

⁸ Postnova V. Tatarstan became a center of religious extremism – recognized Republican FSB // *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 24.09.2004.

⁹ Meteleva S. 200 Days In Jihad // *MK*, 19.07.2004.

¹⁰ Ignatenko A. Bloodstained Road to Heaven: Shaheed attacks are war for Wahhabi foothold on Russian soil // *NG-Religii*, 16.07.2003.

¹¹ Rechkalov V. Once I Wondered How to Become A Shaheed // *Izvestiya*, 18.06.2004.

¹² KCMSK – Coordinating Center of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, uniting Muftis of the region and presided now by Karachay-Cherkessia's Mufti Ismael Berdiew. The structure stresses independence of Caucasian people from Tatar dominated CDUM and CMR.

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
Russia, Moscow, 119334 Leninsky prospect 45, office 480
phone/fax: (+7-095) 775-0418. www.mdb.cast.ru