

*DISCUSSION PAPER ON
APPROACHES TO ANTI-RADICALIZATION
AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SPACE*

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Section 1. A comparative overview of government approaches to counter-radicalization in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the US

Introduction

A trend common across Europe is that there is a decrease in terrorist incidents driven by Al Qaeda (AQ) command and control in South Asia. The conviction earlier this month of the UK dirty bombers under Dhiren Barot represents one of the last of this kind of ‘outside-inside’ attack. Governments are increasingly confronted, instead, with ‘home-grown’ terrorist networks. The threat has morphed from a Jihadi *organization* with a physical headquarters and chain of command to a Jihadi *movement* – an ideology motivating dispersed groups internationally.

Terrorists who trained in Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda (AQ) camps are still relevant actors in Europe. For instance, new evidence about the 7/7 bombers shows that Mohamed Siddique Khan and one of his co-bombers made connections with AQ in visits to Pakistan. The difference, however, is that Sid Khan sought out AQ. AQ did not seek out Sid Khan.²

The rise of ‘home-grown’ Jihadis inspired by a movement or ideology as opposed to an organization from outside has deep implications for governments trying to graft counter-radicalization strategies:

The first implication has been that developments and communities at home are watched much more closely. How Muslims integrate and what to do about the evolution of parallel societies along with parallel values within European countries is no longer the

¹ This paper was prepared for the Weidenfeld Institute for Strategic Dialogue for a Weidenfeld Institute/Migration Policy Institute Conference in Washington, DC on June 28-29, 2007. **The information contained herein should be considered copyrighted by Jonathan Paris.** Mr. Paris is a London-based Transatlantic, Middle East and Islamic movement analyst and Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington. A former Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and Senior Associate Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Mr. Paris completed a study in 2006 on radical Islam in Europe for the US government.

² See Shiv Malik, My Brother the Bomber, Prospect Issue 135, June 2007 http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9635

sole province of social scientists and social workers. Security and the prevention of terrorism depend, increasingly, on such socio-economic dynamics on the ground.

The second implication is that radicalization is now seen as a more important component of terrorism than before. Rather than focus on the terrorist slipping in from a training camp in Afghanistan, governments must now focus on the process by which ordinary citizens, some second or third generation citizens, become radicalized. It is now widely understood that ‘home-grown’ terrorists are inspired by radical ideas before they become willing to carry out terrorism and that joining radical groups is often a stepping stone to terrorism. Governments are more attentive to countering those radical ideas and are even trying to de-radicalize those within their countries who buy into them.³ On this point, governments do differ, sometimes sharply.

The third implication is that governments need to develop much better ties with Muslim communities, first because the authorities require their help to source intelligence to counter terrorist acts, and second because they can be crucial in the processes of preventing radicalization. (This paper examines this implication in Section 2 which focuses on community policing strategies.)

United Kingdom

The British have a long tradition of upholding free speech and providing a haven for dissidents from other countries. “Londonistan” was the moniker given by French security services frustrated with the UK’s reluctance to extradite an Algerian involved in terrorist acts against public transportation services in Paris during the mid-1990’s. The premise in the UK has long been that government should neither try to direct nor interfere with citizens’ ideas and views: this is the domain of civil society and the marketplace of ideas, even radical ones, is better left unregulated by government.

The debate in the UK these past few years over whether to outlaw Hizb ut-Tahrir or HT, also known as the Islamic Liberation Party, is an example of government upholding the view that groups should not be outlawed simply for radical ideas. The British legal system retains a distinction between word and deed. The platform and pronouncements of Hizb ut-Tahrir do not make them outlaws, notwithstanding their homophobic and anti-Semitic dogma and their call for the replacement of the British political and legal system with the caliphate under Shari’ah law.⁴

Germany, by contrast, outlawed HT because they violate a provision in the German Constitution proscribing groups that advocate anti-Semitic beliefs. The UK has no such provision, although it does have laws against inciting racial hatred. Even the fact that HT

³ If persuasion and mobilization by imams and media are the critical enablers of radicalization, then criminal law-enforcement approaches that focus on the operational but not on the motivational side, and treat the symptoms rather than its causes, may be insufficient to deal with the terrorist threat. Emphasis must be placed on influential figures such as Abu Hamza al Masri, the imam who made such a deep impression on his followers, including Richard Reid, the Shoe Bomber, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the twentieth 9/11 hijacker. For every charismatic imam, there are several more young men converted to the cause of radical Islam who pose potential threats to their societies. See Jonathan Paris, “A Framework for Understanding Radical Islam’s Challenge to European Governments” Transatlantic Institute Briefing Report, May 7, 2007, p. 3.

⁴ Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” *Foreign Affairs*, Nov-Dec 2005, Vol. 84, Number 6, p. 68

is an international organization actively engaged in violence in parts of Central Asia has not been deemed sufficient to move the Home Office to outlaw the group.

To understand the UK's approach one has to look at the way in which British values have evolved, the UK's history of race and minority relations and multiculturalism.

For the British, multiculturalism has its origins in the history of the British Empire. Britain ruled its colonies in the 18th and 19th centuries in places like Yemen with only hundreds of British troops and colonial administrators, and whole subcontinents like India with not much more than thousands. They governed by working with leaders of the native communities and monopolizing firearms and other sources of coercive power. The British authorities did not care much how the local authorities kept law and order, or whether their cultures diverged from British or western values. What mattered was whether the local leaders could keep their people in order. This 'live and let live' philosophy carried over during the waves of migration of whole villages of Kashmiri men in the late 1940's and early 1950's who came to take up jobs in the mines and factories of northern England.

In 2001 UK authorities became aware that there was a link between extremist ideas being propounded in London by preachers like Abu Qutada, known as Osama Bin Laden's religio-ideological mentor, and Abu Hamza al Masri, who preached at the Finsbury Mosque in London. Emerging connections between the 9/11 bombers and the radical ideas being promoted by certain figures in the UK put into question the 'live and let live' credo of multiculturalism.

Another factor prompting a retreat from multiculturalism was the evolving demographic situation in London and some of the northern cities of the UK. British Muslims now number over 2 million.⁵ Muslims outnumber all the other minorities in the UK combined and over 10% of London is Muslim. The largest cohort within the Muslim population is males aged 16-25, which is the group most susceptible to radicalization.⁶

Nonetheless, the prevailing view of the Home Office has been that radical ideas are part of a phase that people, particularly young people, go through. To paraphrase one Minister of State, there is nothing wrong with having strong views against the Bush/Blair policy on Iraq or other issues as long as you do not veer into violence. Countering that view however have been other official voices like that of the former head of MI5, who told this author that the period of time in which a radical becomes a terrorist is shortening from years to months.⁷

⁵ Abid of the Muslim Contact Unit of the Met Police estimated a current 2007 population of 2,250,000 UK Muslims. The often used 1.6 million is based on a census of 2001 and does not account for the illegal Muslims, the legal immigrants in the last six years and the natural increase from birth in that same period.

⁶ To take one city, Bradford, UK, one of the early destinations of Pakistani immigrants after the Second World War, the 1991 census recorded 64,000 Muslims representing 13 per cent of the population. By 2001, there were 94,000 Muslims, a 50 per cent increase from 1991. In 2001, Muslims represented nearly 20 per cent of overall population but over 30 per cent of students and 50 per cent of toddlers. By 2011, Muslims will represent close to 30 per cent of the population in Bradford and over 50 per cent of its students. Alex R. Alexiev, presenter at Conference, "Les Democracies face au defi Islamiste," Institut pour la Defense de la Democratie and Center for Security Policy, Paris, 13 March 2006. The high growth rates and youth bubble create a burgeoning pool of young Muslim males.

⁷ Conversation at RUSI Conference on Politics and Terrorism, London, March 14, 2007

The combination of Jihadi groups on the ground attempting to radicalize young British Muslims, the persuasive messages of Jihadi internet, and the connection with Muslim victims all over the world assisted by Arab satellite television, have compelled British authorities to look more closely at the role of UK groups that promote radical views.

There has been a marked government shift away from engagement for the sake of engagement towards a more selective, values-based approach. Now when the Home Office holds dialogues with the Muslim community, they are no longer dominated by the Muslim Council of Britain. The British Government is backing away from condoning groups when they show themselves to be “extremist.” Extremism is now seen as a mid-point between holding radical views and actively engaging in acts of terrorism. Although they may stop short of outright advocating violence, extremists succor and support those who would engage in it.

Specific policy and legislative steps that the UK has taken to counter radicalization include:⁸

1. legislation was passed following the 7/7 bombing that makes any glorification of terrorism no longer permitted.⁹
2. The holding period for suspects increased from 7 to 28 days.¹⁰
3. The budgets for MI5 and police anti-terrorism units and other security services has increased significantly.
4. The Home Office has reorganized by moving non-terrorist affairs over to the Department of Justice and retaining at the Home Office an enlarged Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, which becomes the focal point within the government for counter-radicalization initiatives.
5. At the same time, recognizing the need for grass roots engagement and prevention, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was established. While criticized initially for being overly lenient with radical groups, Minister, Ruth Kelly, has moved to publicly criticize separatist tendencies amongst certain British Muslim communities, and has insisted on immigrants learning English. Additionally the DCLG no longer funds Muslim organizations that refuse to condemn discrimination on the basis of gender, anti-Semitism, and other *core British values*. The latter is a term that has increasingly been used in political discussions about the battle against radicalization.

⁸ Note that only the first of the following four mantras of British counter terrorism policy deal with anti-radicalization:

- i. Prevent - get at root causes. Anti radicalization strategies
- ii. Protect – citizens and infrastructure. Harden soft targets
- iii. Pursue – across borders. Disrupt support networks. Cut off funding. B ring to justice
- iv. Respond- make public more resilient after attack. Manage and minimize consequences, improve capabilities to deal with the aftermath and needs of victims. See Report of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 1-2 December 2005.

⁹ However, the law against glorification of terrorism has yet to be applied and tested in the Courts.

¹⁰ The Blair Government sought more sweeping powers for police to detain suspects up to 90 days but backed down as a result of challenges from House of Lords. Recent media reports of the absconding of several serious suspects underscores problem with current control order system and may lead to additional attempts by the Government to push the Lords and courts to accept more security measures for public safety at the expense of individual rights.

France

With the more frequent appearance of the notion of core British values, there has been something of a shift in British approach but at the heart of traditional British multiculturalism was a reluctance to assert the superiority of any value system. The traditional French approach on the other hand is itself a value system: namely, the Republican ideal that subjugates group or ethnic identity in favor of a universal secular citizenship ideal based on ‘**Liberte, égalité, fratenite**’. Those who confront the French Republican ideals are dealt with categorically by a system defined by *laicite* or secularism that limits expressions of religion in the public sphere.

The history of Muslims in France is, like in the UK, colored by France’s colonial past which was guided by a missionary zeal to transform colonies and their people into Republican citizens, assuming their values and political system. In sum, the approach was assimilation. The bulk of the approximately 5 to 6 million Muslims in France come from Algeria. Algeria had been incorporated into France as one of its regions and its residents became French citizens. Most Algerian Muslims came to France after the Algerian War of Independence in the late 1950’s and 1960’s. Their French citizenship status was never in doubt.

Robust Legal Regime. When it comes to combating extremism, the French system of *laicite* is buttressed by a tougher legal regime than is found in the UK and other European countries. French law prohibits hate-speech and authorizes the preventive detention of those that incite violence more or less indefinitely. These measures make it easier to deport imams and extremists, even if they hold French passports. French law also permits the security apparatus to engage in more extensive surveillance techniques. A specialized judiciary branch for terrorism has evolved with judges that act in some ways as prosecutors.

The French have the recent and relevant experience of fighting what some would identify as the forerunners of al Qaeda in the mid 1990s, when the Paris subway was bombed several times by members of the Algerian extremist group GIA.¹¹ Unburdened by the British system of rights for defendants, French governments have imposed stronger anti-terrorist legislation over the last 30 years, passed by a very willing parliament.

The problem with the French reliance on a legal deterrent through prosecution and deportation is that inadequate resources are invested in the root causes and *ideological dimensions of extremism*. The French government’s hyper-secular vantage point also makes it difficult for them to debate Islamists. It seems therefore that the French approach can largely be characterized as one that keeps the symptoms under control, while failing to address their underpinnings.

Socio-Economic Problems and Representation. The engine of radicalization that most concerns French authorities is the social isolation, economic hardships and general hopelessness of the largely North African youth living in the high rise apartment complexes in suburbs that surround major French cities. These youth resent the

¹¹ Jonathan Paris, Europe and its Muslims, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2007), p.182-184.

hypocrisy of the ethnically 'blind' system when employers refuse to hire them because their name is Hassan or Mohamed. The failure of French aspirational values (equality, solidarity, etc.) to deliver the jobs and wealth promised by assimilation was at the heart of the riots seen in November 2005. The rioters attacked symbols of authority by burning police stations, symbols of unfulfilled promises of education by burning kindergartens and symbols of the wealth they had been denied by burning cars.

Analysts of the 2005 riots are correct in noting that the Islamists still have not penetrated the hearts and minds of disadvantaged French Muslim youth, but France appears to be at a critical point. Many believe that if the harsh tactics of the police are replaced by engagement and dialogue, and by a fairer representation of minorities in government and the media, then the Islamists may be unable to prevail. President Sarkozy's challenge is to create job opportunities so that the promises of *égalité* resonate among the unemployed and alienated youth of North African origin.

In addition to closer government focus on the economic causes of radicalization, the French are beginning to address the near absence of minority political representation. Until the recent elections, hardly any French Muslims competed for local seats in the National Assembly.¹²

The French have also retreated somewhat from their policy of ethnic blindness and rigid assimilation. In 2003, then Interior Minister Sarkozy created a Muslim Council as a concession to religious identity politics, but this has had a mixed reception amongst Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In addition, Sarkozy has been open to exploring affirmative action, hitherto largely rejected in France. He supported the government's creation of a Museum of Immigration as a way to pay homage to the history of immigrants in France and their contribution to French society, culture and commerce. Since his rise to the Presidency, Sarkozy has also established a new Ministry for Immigration and Integration again signaling something of a shift away from France's traditional stance.

While France's hitherto harsh secularism and poor record on socio-economic integration have alienated and marginalized Muslim communities, the overarching and very visible, French value-system has been seen by many as an effective tool in countering the appeal of radical ideologies. For instance, in a Pew Research poll of Muslims conducted in the spring of 2006 that asked respondents whether they identified more strongly with their nationality or their religion, 81 percent of British Muslims said they were Muslim first and British second, compared with only 46 percent of French Muslims saying they were Muslim first, French second.¹³

¹² Molly Moore, Washington Post, June 10, 2007, writes: "None of the 555 district seats representing continental France, where an estimated 10 percent of the population is made up of Africans, Arabs or other minorities. At least 250 minority candidates are running for the National Assembly this year in continental France, compared with little more than a dozen five years ago. While those figures remain only a small percentage of the 7,639 candidates seeking legislative office, political analysts say they represent a seismic shift in French politics."

¹³ Jonathan Paris, "Europe and its Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2007), p.182-184

Overall, it would seem that the French are inching towards a slightly more Anglo-Saxon approach to integration, while the British have adopted some elements of the French values-based citizenship approach.

Germany

The Muslim community in Germany is characterized by the predominance of Turkish migrants. Of about 3.2 million Muslims, 2 million are of Turkish origin; about 300,000 are of Arab origin; and between one-third and one-half of the Arabs are of Moroccan origin.¹⁴ The German experience with its Muslims might be given poor marks in terms of integration but good marks in terms of averting, thus far, lethal terrorist incidents and other manifestations of radicalization. On the integration front, the historic approach to immigrants as short term laborers, without thought of the longer term status of those that decided to stay meant that in general the government's emphasis was on getting Muslim and other immigrant groups to adhere to the dominant German identity.

On the radicalization front, some attribute the absence of terrorist attacks to an ethnic cleavage between Turkish and Arab communities. The idea is that factional in-fighting diverts individuals from either side from targeting non-Muslims. The more likely explanation however is that most Turks, who themselves have come from a sharply secular political system, do not buy into radical Islamist interpretations of their religion or the transnational AQ networks. The Muslim migration to Germany historically was driven by economic opportunity. Unlike the UK and France, Germany was never a colonizer of the countries from which its Muslims emigrated.

This is not to say that Germany does not face a threat from future radicalization. That threat comes from several causes, the foremost being the failure of the Muslim populations to integrate into German society and the related lack of upward mobility within the parallel communities that have arisen in the major cities of Germany. From grandfather to grandson, there is little spoken German, little economic advancement and a pattern of illiterate foreign child mothers that have not accessed modern health care and education. Within a mile in either direction, Lebanese neighborhoods exist without contact with non-Lebanese communities and Turkish neighborhoods exist without contact with anyone other than Turks.¹⁵

Compounding the slow pace of Muslim integration is the growing clash of cultural patriarchal mores within the Turkish community pitting the tradition of 'cousin marriage' against the desire of German Turkish women (and men) to marry by choice and outside their families. After several high profile honor killings, which have also occurred in the UK, authorities are beginning to assert 'German' values of gender equality and insist on "citizens' responsibilities as well as citizens' rights."¹⁶

¹⁴ Guido Steinberg, "Muslims and Islamism in Germany: An Overview," draft paper, March 2007, p. 1.

With relatively high birth rate Muslim population is expected to double to 6.5 million by 2015. The Muslim youth bulge will be especially conspicuous in coming decades with the fairly dramatic decline in the birth rate of indigenous Germans.

¹⁵ Meeting with Marcus Kerber, director of German Islam Conference, Berlin, April 20, 2007

¹⁶ Christopher Caldwell, New York Times Magazine, May 27, 2007, p. 49. For the UK parallel, see Karen McVeigh, "Special units to crack down on honor killing," The Guardian, June 16, 2007.

The German Ministry of Interior sees a link between lack of integration and radicalization. First generation Turkish or Kurdish immigrants may be immune to radical Islamist ideology, but as in other European countries, second and third generation German Muslims are more susceptible to the call of virtual Islamism and less fettered by ethnic moorings. The German approach is to improve integration by making it more difficult for Turks to have arranged marriages with child brides, often from the poorest parts of Anatolia. New legislation that is pending will require that a bride must be at least 18-years-old and have some knowledge of the German language before being permitted to immigrate. The aim is for this to support the upward mobility of the next generation, which is closely linked the level of education of mothers. Parenthetically, one of the triggers of the 7/7 UK bomb leader's radicalization was his Pakistani parents' insistence on an arranged marriage, which he rejected. The radical groups embraced his decision to marry consensually, as a right granted by true Islam.¹⁷ But while the German federal government is trying to address cultural mores that are incompatible with European values of free choice, the regional governments have taken a variety of positions that at times have been contradictory to national policy.

Overall, the German strategy on radicalization can best be characterized as preventive. The government senses that Turkey's increasing political turmoil will impact on German Turks. Islamist organizations like Milli Görüş have expanded their activities recently and their members are known to be extremely violent even though the group has stayed just within the borders of lawful extremism. The German government has banned two other groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliph State Organization, for adopting views that are so extremist as to violate the German Constitution and represent a clear danger.¹⁸

In the last year, the German Ministry of Interior has created a new initiative for preventing radicalization. Called the German Islam Conference (Islamkonferenz), the government has invited apolitical segments of the Muslim community, including artists, teachers, electricians and businesswomen to a structured debate with government (including representatives of all the regional governments and relevant ministries). This selection of people are intended to represent the 'everyman' and identify as Muslims only in terms of their faith. This outreach effort balances the usual participants in such conferences, who are drawn from the 'official' Muslim representative organizations. The Conference conducts a series of "circles" or working groups on different topics including:

- i. reconciling different religions to achieve common values
- ii. the role of faith based schools
- iii. economic programs
- iv. media coverage to foster integration, and even
- v. debating clubs.¹⁹

¹⁷ See Shiv Malik, My Brother the Bomber, Prospect, Issue 135, June, 2007 http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9635

¹⁸ Guido Steinberg, "Muslims and Islamism in Germany: An Overview," draft paper, March 2007, p.5. Arguably, the tough German stance on these two extremist organizations deters others from crossing the line that might be transgressed in a more liberal environment.

¹⁹ Meeting with Marcus Kerber, director of German Islam Conference, Berlin, April 20, 2007.

The German government claims that Muslims engaged in German local politics rarely if ever espouse radical views.²⁰ As in the case of France, the government is encouraging more political representation of Muslims. If successful, the government hopes to undermine what it considers a key motivator of radicalization by proving the radicals' assertion of Muslim political marginalization to be false.

United States

The first question one might ask in assessing America's anti-radicalization strategies is whether American Muslims are in danger of becoming radicalized. The recent Pew study estimates US Muslims at 2.35 million of which 850,000 are under 18.²¹ Although some consider this figure to be low, if it is reasonably accurate then the Muslim populations of the UK and the US are almost the same sizes even though America's population is over five times larger. 33% of average mosque-goers in the US are of South Asian origin, 30% are Black and 25 % are Arabs.

America is fairly new to Muslim immigration. Muslims did not migrate to the US in significant numbers until the 1970's and 1980's, driven by political events like the Iranian revolution of 1979. Muslim immigrants are a diverse mix with one common ingredient. They tend to be well educated and earn much more income than their counterparts in Europe. Taking all US Muslims, 95% are high school graduates and 60% are college graduates.²² Like other 'hyphenated' Americans, many Muslim immigrants have been able to achieve the American dream while maintaining their ethnic and religious identities.

Compared to the demographic trends visible in Europe, America's population is still growing, mainly through non-Muslim Hispanic and East Asian immigration. It is therefore unlikely that no more than a few American cities like Dearborn, Michigan will contain Muslim majorities in the next several decades.

Absent demographic pressure, one might look for historic instances of Muslim connections to domestic violence. They are hard to find. In the early 1970's there was some concern that the Black Muslims under Elijah Muhammed of Chicago might follow the example of the dramatic terrorist acts of the PLO. Other than the odd editorial in their newspapers, and the Black Panther kidnap of Patty Hearst and other one-off incidents, the Black Muslim community largely stayed away from violence and radicalism.²³ Arab radicals were both geographically and politically too distant from the US. Radicalization in prisons is a serious problem for both the US and Europe, but it is not a uniquely Muslim problem.

The two groups that concern US authorities are converts who become extremist and young American Muslims who travel abroad and meet AQ members or other extremists in Pakistan or the Middle East. The most notorious convert is Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn

²⁰ Meeting with M. Maor, Interior Ministry, Berlin, April 20, 2007.

²¹ "Muslim Americans," Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007, p. 10.

²² Alexandra Marks, "Radical Islam finds US sterile ground." Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 2006

²³ Louis Farrakhan, successor to Elijah Muhammed, did taunt the Jewish community, cavort with Muammar Ghaddafi and lead Million Man marches, but in the end, his bark was louder than his bite.

(born Adam Pearlman)²⁴, the former rock star enthusiast raised in southern California by parents who might be loosely referred to as “hippies”. After latching on to some Salafists at a local mosque, Adam eventually became transformed into the fairy tale “Azzam al Amriki,” perhaps today’s leading English speaking propagandist for Al Qaeda. This is a story of a lost soul transformed into what the philosopher, Eric Hoffer, called “the True Believer.”²⁵

There is a third group of potentially radicalized Muslims since 9/11, namely, those alienated by US foreign policy and especially those targeted by US domestic surveillance. The US Justice Department sweeps against illegal immigrants from Muslim countries yielded few, if any, terrorists but much anger on the part of the targeted Muslim community who felt they were singled out for their ethnicity and/or religion.²⁶ The confused and overzealous administrative enforcement of ambiguous language in new legislation like the Patriot Act led to many of the excesses. This has, to some extent, been curtailed as the panic and vengeful hysteria of the post 9/11 period faded.

Still, US authorities are focused on the “nodes” or environments where radicalization might occur²⁷ and where extremist imams and other “preceptors”²⁸ may find influential venues including prisons, publishing, on line forums, audio lectures, university campuses, Islamic conferences and institutes, coffee houses, book stores, gyms and mosques.²⁹ Some analysts have suggested there is potential for any Muslim to become radicalized through the seductive Jihadist menu of media imagery, socio-economic exclusion and a set of simple but internally consistent religious and ideological conceptions. Some have recommended that the US take measures to counter radicalization through community policing (see Section 2), more video surveillance as in the UK, and better information sharing capabilities within government and between government and the public.³⁰

The more prevalent view is that home-grown Jihadis are unlikely to find fertile ground inside America, and government energies are best focused on external threats.³¹ One external threat is the targeting of Americans in Europe³² and the other is the 9/11 type scenario where radicals with European passports gain access to the US through the visa waiver program.

²⁴ Gadahn's Jewish paternal grandfather, Carl Pearlman, was a prominent surgeon and on the Board of Directors of the Anti-Defamation League.

²⁵ See Eric Hoffer's classic book on mass movements, *The True Believer* (1951).

²⁶ One initiative, known as Special Registration, had more than 80,000 immigrant men were fingerprinted, photographed and questioned by US authorities.

²⁷ Nodes are defined as “conduits that facilitate or support a person or group through the radicalization process.” Javad Ali Statement on Radicalization, House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Sept 20, 2006

²⁸ “Preceptorism” is a term coined by the Yale social scientist, Charles E. Lindblom, in the 1975 classic, *Politics and Markets*, to describe intense ideological indoctrination using persuasive messages to mobilize cadres of true believers. *Preceptors* include charismatic orators who rely on **persuasion** to gain the voluntary enthusiasm of their disciples rather than on fear and command. Hitler, Mao, Nasser, Khomeini, Nasrallah and Ahmadinejad are *preceptors*. Stalin and Saddam Hussein were plain old dictators.

²⁹ Donald Van Duyn statement on Islamic Radicalization, House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Sept 20, 2006.

³⁰ Steven Simon testimony on Priorities for Homeland Security, US Senate Committee on Homeland Security, September 2006.

³¹ Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Dept. of Homeland Security, was reported to have said that it is “very hard to detect” a Jihadi terrorist who is “purely domestic, self-motivated, and self initiating.” After 9/11, there have been several well documented plots discovered. The Padilla plot was interesting in that the accused was an Hispanic convert. The Lackawanna 6, the Miami plot, the Columbus, Ohio shopping mall plot, and the recent Guyana JFK airport gas pipeline plot all suggest only a loose connection with AQ, a high degree of intent to hurt and kill Americans but little capacity, training or sophistication. Most of these groups were infiltrated by informants (usually because they offered the expertise, which is the critical constraint to successful terrorism).

³² Jonathan Stevenson, security and terrorist expert, delivered a paper at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in June 2002 that suggested the US would harden its targets, leaving Europe as the soft target (for attacks on Americans and non-American).

Section 2. Comparative assessment of the successes and failures of community policing methodologies.

Community Policing is defined as a preventive style of policing that focuses on building local relationships to engage relevant communities.³³

Its goals are:

1. promoting outreach, enhancing inclusiveness and integration, and minimizing the disaffection that can lead to radicalization particularly among Muslim youth;
2. serving as an early warning system on the ground resources to identify incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and
3. opening up new channel of communications with individuals who can navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam and provide much needed context to inform intelligence analysis.³⁴

Communities gain from community policing by regaining a sense of control over their environment and having an opportunity to demonstrate their civic responsibility (especially important to communities in the US) and having a channel for addressing their own concerns regarding terrorism and lawlessness. Other approaches discussed below are traditional policing, zero tolerance policing and intelligence-led policing.

Community policing is viewed as a long-term process that depends heavily on developing partnerships or two-way flows of information with the community. Talking at the community does not lead to the information needed by the police. Engaging with the community requires listening to their concerns, their political views, and their hardships and complaints.

The main criticism of community policing, which applies to other policing methodologies, is the absence of **metrics** to evaluate their success. Is it enough to say that the 'lack of a crime scene' is proof that a particular policing methodology is working?³⁵

The other criticisms of community policing are:

1. Interlocutors from the community are reluctant to cooperate with authorities in turning in the home grown Jihadis. Peter Clarke, head of Police Counter-Terrorism in the United Kingdom, stated bluntly in a public address on April 24, 2007 that "(a)most all of our prosecutions have their origins in intelligence that

³³ The formal definition of community policing is a "policing strategy and approach aimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime through proactive engagement with the community. This assumes greater accountability for the police, a greater role for the community in collaborative problem solving, and a greater concern for civil rights and liberties. Friedman, Robert, "Community Policing: Some conceptual and Practical considerations" Home Affairs Review, 1996, pp 114-23.

³⁴ Homeland Security Institute (HSI), Community Policing within Muslim communities, 27 December 2006, p. ii.

³⁵ Email from former FBI director of community policing initiatives who argues that metrics aren't always easy but the "lack of a crime scene" sounds trite yet combined with a continual and meaningful dialogue with the Arab - American (primarily) community, it can serve as one measure of success. June 14, 2007.

- came from overseas, the intelligence agencies or from technical means. Few have yet originated from what is sometimes called ‘community intelligence.’³⁶
2. There is a disturbing disconnect between priorities of the government, focused on promoting integration and countering extremism at the local level, and the Muslim community leaders who are focused, especially in Britain, on Islamophobia in the media and British foreign policy on Iraq, Palestine and other places far away.
 3. Community policing is never a replacement for traditional police work in combating terrorism.
 4. Terrorists have moved further underground in response to police outreach into community elders and mosques.³⁷
 5. There is a risk of police being so reliant on a group of Muslims for information that the police will be reluctant to break with or arrest members of the group in other circumstances, a risk that can sacrifice the rights of the public in order to placate the Muslim community. Some echoed this concern after London Metropolitan Police Chief, Ian Blair announced his soft policing strategy to establish “hundreds of Safer Neighborhoods” teams.³⁸
 6. Advocates of civil liberties are concerned about turning citizens into ‘spies’ on their fellow citizens when they engage in information exchanges with community police.³⁹
 7. Questions as to whether the information elicited from some members of the community is tainted by Jihadi network efforts to deceive the police.
 8. Whether the community will react negatively when the police hold back tactical information on specific counter-terrorism strategies.
 9. Whether the real value of policing comes from up and down partnerships within the police command rather than “parochial” relationships on a neighborhood level between local police units and the community.⁴⁰
 10. Many smaller police departments lack the manpower to sustain the effort and invest significant time effort and energy over the long term, preferring to look for quick successes.

The general response to the above criticisms from advocates of networking with Muslim communities is that there is no alternative to community policing. Traditional policing can supplement community policing but it cannot substitute for the kind of information gained from the community through engagement.

After briefly outlining alternative policing methodologies, this section compares community policing strategies in the US, UK, France and Germany.

³⁶ Peter Clarke, “Learning from Experience-Counter Terrorism in the UK since 9/11,” The Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture, Policy Exchange, London, April 24, 2007.

³⁷ Christopher Caldwell, *New York Times Magazine*, June 25, 2006.

³⁸ Author’s conversation with Lord John Stevens, Ian Blair’s predecessor at the London Metropolitan Police, who has a healthy regard for traditional policing. Berlin, December 11, 2004.

³⁹ Laura Donohue, professor at Stanford Law School, echoed this concern in response to my criticism of British professors for declaring their refusal to “spy” on campuses in rebuffing pleas for help from authorities in identifying Islamic extremists engaged in radicalizing activities on campuses. This exchange took place at a National Conference of the Council on Foreign Relations roundtable on homeland security, June 8, 2007.

⁴⁰ John Murray, “Policing Terrorism”, *Police Practice and Research* 6, no 4 (September 2005)

Traditional policing relies primarily on crime solving techniques from within the police department. Traditional policing gained ground as police departments became more professionalized in order to root out corruption and brutality. One consequence of professionalization, however, is a growing separation of police from the community and reliance on fellow police for information and paradigms for solving crimes. Mentoring of junior officers by senior officers reinforced the camaraderie within an increasingly insular institution.

Intelligence-based policing is a form of community policing that emphasizes the gathering of information from the community as opposed to the gaining of trust from the community. It is not a distinct policing methodology and can be viewed as a subset of community policing.

Zero Tolerance Policing (ZTP) relies on the ‘broken glass’ theory which holds that strong use of coercive power to stop minor infractions prevents more serious types of crime by contributing to an overall feeling of safety. ZTP is a deterrence-oriented, get-tough approach that replaces the ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ approach with an ‘iron fist in an iron glove.’

The criticism of ZTP is that this kind of policing alienates the community, dries up sources of intelligence information on radicalization, encumbers police with administrative details from arrests for very minor offences, and often violates minority rights that sometimes lead to incidents of corruption and brutality. The consensus among most experts is that it is far better to utilize problem-oriented policing of which community policing is the major brand.⁴¹ Community policing is a profession that emphasizes open training and working with values rather than with rules. It may be that the combination of community and traditional policing is the optimal policy for dealing with radicalization in urban areas.⁴²

United States

In the last couple of years there has been fresh thinking among experts on how to utilize the public in dealing with the terrorist threat. This new thinking will enhance the emphasis on community policing. Steven Flynn, a border-control expert and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that there were two narratives of 9/11 but only the second one is now beginning to be understood. The first narrative was the combative Bush Administration mantra of taking the fight to the enemy abroad and drawing clear lines with slogans such as the Global War on Terrorism and “you are either with us or against us.” There is little role for the average citizen in wars with armies and high tech weaponry.

⁴¹ Martin Innes, “An iron fist in an iron glove?” the Zero Tolerance Policing Debate.” *The Howard Journal* 38, no. 4 (Nov. 1999) p. 397-410.

⁴² Traditional policing relies on a paramilitary structure that tends to distance police from rest of community. It is also a craft learned on the job. Community policing stresses cooperation and when working effectively, it reduces not just the incidence of crime but also the fear of crime. The best situation is complementary traditional and community policing in which “the maintenance of a capability to counter extreme acts of violence is within a genuine community policing model.” John Murray, “Policing Terrorism,” *Police Practice and Research* 6, no 4 (September 2005).

The second narrative is the story of the doomed passengers on UA Flight #93. Having heard about the explosions at the World Trade Center from their conversations on mobile phones, several of the passengers in the hijacked plane figured out quickly that UA#93 may have been part of the same terrorist plan. These courageous passengers decided to “Let’s Roll” and storm the cockpit, which appeared to have panicked the hijackers into crashing the plane into an open field in Pennsylvania. Flynn’s point is that with information, the public can be trusted to act wisely, courageously and decisively to thwart terrorism. He adds that elites in Britain underestimated the public’s resiliency during the German Blitz of 1940 and the elites in the US similarly underestimated the people of New York City’s ability to stay calm and stoic, and to help the victims in the wake of 9/11.⁴³

Flynn extrapolates the narrative of UA#93 with a typology of **hard policy** to improve capacity to collect intelligence to detect and intercept terrorists before they strike with two components of **soft policy**: 1. to work to resolve issues that give rise to the grievances motivating terrorists, and 2. to build a greater level of societal resiliency so consequences of a terrorist attack are less meaningful.

Both national security officials concerned with al Qaeda-type penetration from abroad and local police concerned with home grown radicalization need to change their mindsets from the Cold War era, when authorities were afraid that KGB spies would steal information in US strategic sites, and get information out to the public quickly and regularly.

Community outreach to minority neighborhoods and particularly to Arab-American communities enhances all three hard and soft policy components: the information from the streets may offer intelligence for prevention; the feeling of consultation and partnership gives minorities the assurance that they are not the target and enlists their capacities to demonstrate individual and collective civic responsibilities. Finally, should the bomb go off, the community knows that the police will forcefully clamp down on any backlash from non-Muslims.

The cities that have had the greatest success with community policing are those with large concentrations of Arab Americans who are well organized and have had a history of cooperation with the police. Dearborn, Michigan, a city with one of the largest ethnic Arab communities in the US, has a program called the “Bridge” which includes a hotline between police and community leaders following any incident. Chicago, New York, Boston and San Diego also have good networks based on a study of the Partnership for Prevention.⁴⁴ One of several findings in this multi-city study of community policing was that Muslims felt more comfortable cooperating with local police than with federal authorities. This is especially true when members of minorities see their own ethnicity in their policemen. New York’s police department roughly matches the ethnic composition of the city, which accounts for much of the success of its community policing. The distrust of federal agents may be one of the negative outcomes of the federal illegal

⁴³ Steven Flynn, roundtable on homeland security, National Conference of the Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2007.

⁴⁴ Deborah Ramirez, et al., “Developing Partnerships Between Law Enforcement and American Muslim, Arab and Sikh Communities,” Boston, Northeastern University, 2005.

immigrant identity registrations following 9/11 that many felt unfairly targeted Muslims as opposed to radicals or terrorists.⁴⁵

A corollary program of community policing worth mentioning briefly is one that focuses on engaging young male Muslims in the neighborhoods. Called “positive youth development,” civic engagement by youth is seen as a developmental asset that can promote positive social development and combat youth radicalization from Jihadi movements or inner city gang involvement. Civil engagement enables young Muslims to take the perspective of others, serves as an outlet for the emerging empathetic behaviors of adolescents and gives them a sense of competency and higher self esteem.⁴⁶

United Kingdom

The Muslim Contact Unit at the London Metropolitan Police was set up after 9/11 when the British police realized they needed access to the Muslim communities, elders, imams, and especially, young men who were dabbling with Salafism. Abid, a policeman with the Muslim Contact Unit who is bearded and wears Pakistani dress calls these young men “default Salafists,” as they lack alternative ways to engage more with Islam but they have also not yet crossed the threshold to violence. Abid is precisely the policeman one would want to gain the trust of Muslims in the broader London community and beyond. He understands the various factions within the largely ethnic Pakistani and Bangladeshi community, and he knows how to avoid being side tracked into these factional vendettas by choosing one side over the other. He resists the common trap that outsiders fall into that can be summarized as “Sufi good, Salafi bad”. There are extremists among Sufis and Salafists who condemn violence and radicalism. The point is that without Muslim policeman like Abid, important information would be difficult to come by.

Abid echoes Police Chief Ian Blair who firmly believes that only the communities will defeat terrorism. In this era of home-grown terrorism, the tacit support of local terrorists by their kin and clan, friends and neighbors, provides the critical oxygen that enables the terrorist to function. In order to blunt this tacit support by ‘fence sitters’ in the communities, the police need to engage with them and gain their trust.

The UK's approach to community policing has evolved quite far for a number of reasons. Firstly, UK police have been dealing with race riots in places like Brixton, the Midlands and West Yorkshire going back to the 1980's and earlier, giving them more experience with ethnic communities. More recently the UK has been faced with the urban growth of radicalization amongst young Muslims men. This has forced the security services to develop relationships and alliances within the communities.

In countering Muslim radicalization in the UK, there has been a shift from a crime control response to a more creative approach that tackles the larger issue of integration. The Muslim Contact Unit of the London Metropolitan Police suggests the following:

⁴⁵ One such initiative of the Department of Justice was Special Registration, in which more than 80,000 immigrant men were fingerprinted, photographed and questioned by authorities.

⁴⁶ Aida Balsano and Richard Lerner, “The Role of Developmental Assets and Youth Civic Engagement in Promoting Positive Development Among Youth,” Rand Conference, September 2005.

1. Islam is not the issue. By searching for liberal or moderate Islam, the implication is that there is a problem with Islam itself. This notion feeds into AQ propaganda by making the struggle a war against Islam rather than against the misuse of Islam.
2. The problem for many young Muslims is they cannot get enough Islam from their local mosques. Britain needs more scholarly imams and teachers who can mentor these people and provide answers in an Islamic context to their search for meaning. Otherwise, they risk becoming Salafists by default.
3. One needs to be aware of terminology in order to avoid the unnecessary alienation of Muslims. For instance, Sharia is not necessarily a threat to British laws and values.
4. There is a need to engender more confidence among Muslims to express themselves.
5. The authorities need to engage Salafists and not demonize them.
6. Community policing is a long-term process of building trust. A two-way relationship is needed so that British Muslims are not afraid to express their opinions.

The challenge for the UK is a comprehensive one that includes effective surveillance to avoid deadly attacks, engaging local communities to counter radicalization of its members, seeking to discourage tacit support among members of the community of extremists, and improving the integration of Muslim minorities.

The question is whether the British authorities have the correct balance between community outreach and the safety of the wider public.

The perception of some analysts and elements of the public is that the government is leaning too far in the direction of soft policing without gaining a commensurate amount of intelligence from the community. They see the authorities acquiescing in the radical notions of angry young Muslims and kowtowing to certain political Muslim organizations that claim singularly to represent such a diverse Muslim community. This perception however is not representative of reality; there is a lack of public awareness of the creative counter-radicalization techniques being adopted. But with this lack of public knowledge one must be aware of the serious racial and religious backlash from vocal elements of the UK public if a future terrorist act does occur.

France and Germany

Where the UK may be accused of going too softly on its communities, France might be accused of the opposite. A few months before the riots, then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy supported tough police tactics over community policing in the so-called *zones* by saying he wanted to use a *karcher* or power hose to clean immigrants out and by deriding community policing as “a waste of time, playing soccer with young thugs.”⁴⁷

How to explain the French antipathy toward community policing?

⁴⁷ Jones and Wiseman, “Policing and Terrorism: The French Disconnections and the Lessons for America” Los Angeles Community Policing, 21 March 2006.

- French security services have fairly good intelligence from their penetration of the Algerian immigrant community and their years of experience first with the Algerian War and then with the Algerian related terrorist attacks in Paris in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s.
- The structure of French police forces is highly centralized.
- Since the French citizenship model is culturally and ethnically ‘blind’, authorities are reluctant to implement sustained community policing that targets ethnic immigrant communities, even though that is where many of the social and security problems originate and fester.

Germany, by contrast, has a decentralized federal structure with a central agency in Berlin alongside 16 *Landers* or provinces, each with its own police and security services. The advantages of flexibility that derive from decentralized, localized policing appear to outweigh the disadvantages of duplication of intelligence services. It is not surprising that Germany also has fairly developed community policing outreach that enables them to operate flexibly according to the needs of each province to gather intelligence and form partnerships with Muslims in the highly segregated neighborhoods in urban areas. The *Landers* have been experimenting recently with “community crime prevention,” and have rejected zero tolerance policing in favor of community policing.⁴⁸

The weakness of French reliance on traditional policing was seen in the riots of 2005. Many of the ‘banlieues’ with masses of unemployed North African youth have become no-go zones for the police. There have been attacks on trains from southern cities like Marseilles by groups of North African thugs. (Incidentally however, the police were reluctant to report the train incidents for fear of stirring a backlash against the Muslim communities). Overall though, the lack of police engagement has limited the ability of the authorities to develop trust in the communities. The critical question is whether the traditional policing methodologies will evolve into a community policing format, in part, to prevent radical and extremist groups from gaining traction in these no-go *zones*, which have become ‘black holes’ for the security services.

One structural anomaly of the French police system is that in addition to the Interior Ministry (DST), there is a separate unit, known as the Renseignements Généraux (RG), that deals with community relations. The RG, not the Interior Ministry, go into the zones and interface with the inhabitants there. Given the lack of cooperation between the two agencies and the grim picture in the increasingly isolated *zones*, it is possible that President Sarkozy may unify the RG with the DST, making one agency responsible for internal police and security and community relations, while another agency, the Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST), remains responsible for external security threats.⁴⁹ It is possible that the consolidated Interior Ministry may be more emboldened to explore community policing.

⁴⁸ Jones and Wiseman, “Community Policing in Europe: structure and best practices – Sweden, France, Germany,” Los Angeles Community Policing, 8 Sept 2006.

⁴⁹ Conversation with senior member of the Interior Ministry, Paris, November, 2006.

Some Conclusions

- The study of community policing is a new field and metrics for evaluating their success are only now being developed. There are gaps in understanding the “where” or the nodes where people meet and become radicalized, and the “how” or the process through which people become radicalized. Given that community policing is a long term process, the evidence thus far suggest that where the resource and manpower input is of high quality, the results are positive.⁵⁰
- While community policing may not be the only answer, there appears to be no real alternative to community policing as a means of engaging Muslim communities.
- Buttressing community policing with traditional policing makes sense. They are not contradictory although the open values-based culture of the former often clash with the Para-military, insular, rules-based and professional culture of the latter.
- US Muslim and Arab communities appear more receptive to engagement with local law enforcement than with cooperation with federal authorities.
- In the current era of the home grown Jihadi, where extremists live in the community, authorities cannot expect members of the community to “turn on their own.”⁵¹ It will take time to develop trust and identification with the interests of public safety over allegiances to ethnicity or religious affiliation. These competing interests and conflicting value systems are discussed in one of the other Conference sessions on the way in which governments articulate, textualise, and convey values through society in the transatlantic space as a means to counter radicalization.

⁵⁰ Email from former FBI director of community policing initiatives, June 14, 2007. In a follow-on message, the same expert writes: “the keys to developing lasting, productive relationships between and among law enforcement, intelligence and the community are commitment, perseverance and manpower. The commitment has to be long term, not limited to those instances where an attack takes place and the community feels “targeted” vs. approachable as allies. Those seeking community assistance need to persevere in spite of the hostility, mistrust, animosity and antipathy they will occasionally encounter. There are plenty of well intentioned citizens committed to doing the right thing. You just have to find them. Finally, the effort will be made easier if the department, bureau or agency in question has the requisite manpower to demonstrate a capability to accomplish this challenging yet necessary mission.”, June 18, 2007.

⁵¹ Ludo Block, “Devising a New Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Europe”, *Terrorism Monitor* 4, No. 21 (2 November 2006), p. 4-7.